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Abstract—We consider the M -ary classification problem via
crowdsourcing, where crowd workers respond to simple binary
questions and the answers are aggregated via decision fusion.
The workers have a reject option to skip answering a question
when they do not have the expertise, or when the confidence of
answering that question correctly is low. We further consider
that there are spammers in the crowd who respond to the
questions with random guesses. Under the payment mechanism
that encourages the reject option, we study the behavior of honest
workers and spammers, whose objectives are to maximize their
monetary rewards. To accurately characterize human behavioral
aspects, we employ prospect theory to model the rationality of the
crowd workers, whose perception of costs and probabilities are
distorted based on some value and weight functions, respectively.
Moreover, we estimate the number of spammers and employ
a weighted majority voting decision rule, where we assign an
optimal weight for every worker to maximize the system perfor-
mance. The probability of correct classification and asymptotic
system performance are derived. We also provide simulation
results to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
Index Terms—Classification, crowdsourcing, spammers, hu-
man behavioral analysis, distributed inference, information fu-
sion, prospect theory
I. INTRODUCTION
CROWDSOURCING has attracted intense interest in re-cent years as a new paradigm for distributed inference.
It harnesses the intelligence of the crowd, by exploiting
the inexpensive and online labor markets in an effective
manner [1]–[7]. Crowdsourcing enables a new framework
to utilize distributed human wisdom to solve problems that
machines cannot perform well, like handwriting recognition,
anomaly detection, voice transcription, and image labelling
[8]–[11]. While conventional group collaboration and coop-
eration frameworks rely heavily on a collection of experts in
related fields, the crowd in crowdsourcing usually consists of
non-experts. Therefore, the responses obtained from the crowd
have diverse quality levels, which makes decision fusion in the
problem of classification via crowdsourcing quite challenging.
Although crowdsourcing has been applied in many appli-
cations, the quality of the aggregated result is relatively low
[12]–[14] due to the following reasons. First, the worker pool
is anonymous in nature, which may result in an unskilled and
unreliable crowd [15]. Second, the assumption that the workers
are sufficiently motivated, extrinsically or intrinsically, to take
part seriously in the crowdsourcing task, is highly questionable
[16], [17]. Third, for the non-expert crowd to successfully
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complete the crowdsourcing work, some tasks are specifically
designed to be composed of easy but tedious microtasks [18],
which might cause boredom and result in low-quality work.
Finally, noisy and unreliable responses to the tasks cannot
be detected and tagged before aggregation so that appropriate
weights could be assigned to responses [19]. For this reason,
simple majority voting is widely used as the aggregation rule
and it takes all of the answers (including the noisy and low
quality ones) into account with the same weight [20].
Different methods have been developed to deal with the
above problems [15], [17]–[19], [21]–[25]. In [21], the authors
decompose a complex task into simple binary questions that
are easy for the workers in the crowd to accomplish. It is ex-
pected that very little knowledge would be needed to complete
the microtasks, and typically common sense or observation is
good enough for such microtasks. The authors in [18] employ
taxonomy and dichotomous keys in the design of the simple
binary questions and the optimal question ordering problem
in crowdsourcing is considered in [26]. These schemes that
break hard questions into simple ones lower the chance for
the workers to make mistakes in responding to each of the
questions. Different decision fusion rules are developed in or-
der to deal with the unreliability of the crowd and increase the
classification accuracy [19], [23]. We have proposed the use of
coding and decoding algorithms for reliable classification with
unreliable crowd workers [15], [18]. The comparison between
group control and majority voting techniques are presented in
[17], which suggests that majority voting is more cost-efficient
on simple binary tasks.
In the past literature, crowd workers could only submit
a definitive yes/no answer in responding to a binary micro-
task/question. However, research in psychology [27] indicates
a frequent tendency to select the reject option (no choice)
when the choice set offers several attractive alternatives but
none that can be easily justified as the best. In such cases, the
workers may be unsure in answering some of the questions
because of their lack of expertise. For instance, phonemes
in some languages are very hard to distinguish, especially
for foreigners [28]. To avoid requiring workers to respond to
microtasks beyond their expertise resulting in random guesses,
we considered the optimal design of the aggregation rule in
crowdsourcing systems where the workers are not forced to
make a binary choice when they are unsure of their response
and can choose not to respond [29]. As shown in [30], the
quality of label prediction can be improved by adopting a
decision rejection option to avoid results with low confidence.
The reject option has also been considered in machine learning
and signal processing literatures [31]–[34]. With a reject op-
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2tion, the payment mechanism is investigated in crowdsourcing
systems where the workers can also report their confidence
about the submitted answers [35].
Additionally, in crowdsourcing systems, there can be greedy
crowd workers, also known as spammers, who aim to earn
more monetary rewards by answering as many questions
as possible. They often submit random guesses independent
of the questions being asked. The presence of spammers
degrades the system performance and has posed a threat to
many crowdsourcing applications [36]. Currently, there are
two categories of anti-spammer techniques in crowdsourcing: a
priori reputation system [37], [38] and a posteri quality control
[39]–[41]. The first method aims to manage a pool of honest
workers with high reputation, so as to ensure the reliability
of their answers. However, since the crowd is usually large,
anonymous and transient, it is impractical to keep track of
the workers’ answers and build up a trust relationship. In
quality control schemes, several verifiable (golden standard)
questions are inserted for the workers to answer and those
who do not perform well on these questions are identified
as spammers. However, due to the heterogeneous expertise
levels of the crowd workers and the subjective criterion used
to decide on a spammer, it is easy to mistakenly identify
an honest worker to be a spammer, which discourages the
worker from participating in answering the questions next
time. According to the study in [42], it is better to treat all the
crowd workers to be honest, than risking to identify honest
workers as spammers.
We study the presence of spammers in the context of a
scenario where crowd workers answer questions with a reject
option. The payment mechanism proposed in [35], which en-
courages the workers to skip/reject answering a question below
some confidence threshold, is employed. In this scenario, both
the honest workers and the spammers choose either to ‘answer
a question’1 or ‘skip a question’ to maximize their monetary
rewards. In [35], the authors assume that the workers are
rational decision makers in the sense that they can perceive
the expected payoff of taking each decision without biases.
However, since the crowd workers/spammers are humans,
they are subject to cognitive biases in decision making and
have disparate behavioral properties. The Nobel Prize winning
prospect theory (PT) proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
[43] provides a psychologically accurate description of human
cognitive biases that includes diminishing marginal utility,
risk seeking/aversion and asymmetric valuation of gains and
losses. In realistic crowdsourcing applications, these behav-
ioral properties can not be ignored while developing effective
decision making strategies of the honest crowd workers and
the spammers.
We employ PT to model the rationality of the crowd
workers, and study their behavior while answering or skipping
the microtasks/questions2 in crowdsourcing that has a reject
option. Based on the behavioral difference between the honest
workers and the spammers, we design the optimal aggrega-
tion rule at the fusion center (FC) to combat the effects of
1In this case, honest workers submit their true answers and the spammers
submit random guesses.
2The terms ‘microtask’ and ‘question’ are used interchangeably in the paper.
spammers. The contributions of our work are two fold:
• By applying PT to model human cognitive biases, we
study the optimal behavior of the honest workers and the
spammers based on the payment mechanism proposed
in [35]. This payment mechanism has been proved to
be the only mechanism that satisfies the “no-free-lunch”
rule and exhibits incentive compatibility. We find that
the spammers should either complete or skip all the
microtasks in order to get the maximal reward. The
statistical behavioral properties of the crowd determine
whether the spammers should complete or skip all the
microtasks.
• We provide methods for estimating the number of spam-
mers that is used for weight assignment. We also de-
sign an optimal aggregation rule where the workers
are assigned appropriate weights3. Probability of correct
classification and asymptotic performance of our method
are derived.
It should be noted that our approach only requires the
workers to respond to several microtasks in one session
without identifying themselves. Hence, our proposed method
can be employed in many applications where the workers
remain anonymous and, therefore, it is not required to keep
track of the workers’ profiles. On the other hand, instead of
detecting the spammers, we estimate and employ the number
of spammers while designing the optimal counter-measure to
ameliorate their effects. The spammers still get paid according
to the payment mechanism. As a result, the risk of declaring
honest workers as spammers and preventing them from further
participation is avoided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce the problem of multi-object classification
via crowdsourcing with a reject option. In Section III, by
employing PT, we study the optimal behavior of the honest
crowd workers when their objective is to maximize their
monetary rewards. In Section IV, we consider that there are
spammers in the crowd and develop a weight assignment
scheme for optimal decision aggregation at the FC. Asymptotic
performance analysis of our proposed method is presented in
Section V. We conduct simulation results in Section VI and
conclude our work in Section VII.
II. CLASSIFICATION VIA CROWDSOURCING WITH A
REJECT OPTION
We formulate the classification problem via crowdsourcing
with a reject option in this section. Assume that we have W
workers participating in an M -ary classification task. There
are N = dlog2Me simple binary questions to be answered
by each worker, where we consider that the binary questions
are independent of each other and are of the same difficulty.
For each of the questions, the worker can either provide a
definitive answer “1” (Yes) / “0” (No) [18], [45], or has a
reject option to skip the question, where a skipped answer is
denoted as λ. Let aw represent the N -bit word that contains
the wth worker’s ordered answers to all the microtasks, where
3A brief discussion on the weight assignment was presented in [44]. In this
work, we elaborate on details and explanations related to this model.
3aw(i) ∈ {1, 0, λ} for i = 1, . . . , N . We assume the following
statistical properties for the honest workers in the crowd: let
pw,i be the probability that the wth worker submits λ to the
ith question, i.e, aw(i) = λ, and let rw,i be the probability
that aw(i) is the correct answer to the ith question, given that
the worker has provided definitive answers “1” or “0”. Since
the workers in the crowd are anonymous and have diverse
expertise levels, we consider that pw,i and rw,i are random
and follow certain probability density functions (PDFs) fp(p)
and fr(r), respectively. The expected values of pw,i and rw,i,
namely, the average probability that a worker submits λ to a
question, and the average probability that an answer is correct
given a definitive answer has been submitted, are denoted by
m and µ, respectively.
After the N -bit words regarding an object from all the
workers are collected by the FC, the object needs to be
classified to a class dj ∈ D, j = 1, . . . ,M , where D is the set
of all the object classes and dj is the jth class. From the N -bit
word aw(i) submitted by the wth worker, one can infer the
classification decision of the wth worker namely the subset
of classes Dw4 to which the object belongs to. At the FC,
each class dj inside Dw increments its candidate score by the
weight assigned to the wth worker Ww. After incorporating
the responses from all the W workers, the FC determines the
class with the highest overall candidate score to be the final
classification result:
d∗ = arg max
dj∈D
{
W∑
w=1
WwIDw 〈dj〉
}
, j = 1, . . . ,M, (1)
where IDw 〈dj〉 = 1 if dj ∈ Dw and IDw 〈dj〉 = 0 otherwise.
The objective is to find the appropriate weight assignment Ww
for every worker in the crowd, so that the best classification
performance can be achieved. One approach is to split the
M -ary classification task into N binary hypothesis testing
problems, each of which determines a bit in the N -bit word.
For each hypothesis testing problem, the Chair-Varshney rule
gives the optimal weight as Ww = log
rw,i
1−rw,i [46]. However,
this requires the prior knowledge regarding rw,i for every
worker, which is not available in practice. One may also look
into the minimization of the misclassification probability, for
which a closed-form expression for Ww cannot be derived due
to the lack of prior knowledge of pw,i and rw,i.
We developed a weight assignment scheme to optimize the
crowd workers’ weights [29]:
maximize EC [W]
subject to EO [W] = K
(2)
where EC [W] denotes the crowd’s average weight contri-
bution to the correct class and EO [W] denotes the average
weight contribution to all possible classes. We set K to be
a constant so that the portion of weight contribution to the
correct class is maximized while the weight contribution to
all the classes remains fixed. By assuming that there are no
spammers in the crowd, we showed that the weight assigned
4If all the responses from the wth worker are definitive, Dw is a singleton.
Otherwise, Dw contains multiple classes.
to the wth worker is Ww = µ−n, where n represents the
number of definitive answers the worker submits in total. This
method significantly outperforms the conventional majority
voting approach.
In this following sections, we investigate the impact of
spammers on system performance. Based on the payment
mechanism that encourages the workers to skip the questions
about which they are not sure, we characterize the behavior of
both honest workers and spammers in realistic environments
where they are subject to cognitive biases while decision
making. With this information, we estimate the number of
spammers in the crowd and design the weight assignment
strategy for every worker to ameliorate the impacts of the
spammers and maximize the system performance.
III. BEHAVIOR OF THE HONEST CROWDWORKERS
In this section, we consider that there are no spammers in
the crowd and explore the workers’ behavior in answering
or skipping a microtask. We adopt the payment mechanism
proposed in [35], which encourages the use of the reject option
when the confidence of answering a question is low. The
mechanism was proved to be the only incentive-compatible
mechanism that satisfies the “no-free-lunch” axiom (“no-free-
lunch” axiom requires that the payment is minimum possible
if all the answers attempted by the worker in the gold standard
questions are wrong). Under this payment mechanism, we
discuss the optimal behavior for the honest workers when
they are rational decision makers and want to maximize their
monetary rewards. Next, considering that the honest workers
are human decision makers that are subject to cognitive
biases in practice, we employ prospect theory to model their
behavioral property and analyze their decision making strategy
in realistic environments. Compared to the case where the
workers are assumed to behave rationally, it is shown that
the behavioral factors captured in PT may cause the humans
to act quite differently.
A. Payment Mechanism and Optimal Behavior of Rational
Crowd Workers
The payment to the worker is based on the answers that
the worker gives to the G gold standard questions (which
are not known to the crowdworkers in advance). The goal
of the mechanism is to incentivize the worker to skip the
questions for which its confidence is lower than a threshold
T , where confidence about an answer is the probability of
this answer being correct. The value of T ∈ [0, 1] is chosen
a priori based on factors such as the targeted performance
quality. A larger value of T leads to a higher probability that
a question is skipped (or equivalently, a lower probability that
this question is answered). When T is large, the answer has
a higher probability of being correct given that a definitive
answer has been submitted. Let f denote the payment rule,
which is proposed in [35] and is written as
f(x1, . . . , xG) = κ
G∏
i=1
αxi + µmin (3)
4where xj ∈ {−1, λ,+1}, 1 ≤ j ≤ G, are the responses to
the gold standard questions. “−1” denotes that the worker at-
tempted to answer the microtask and the answer was incorrect,
“λ” denotes that the worker skipped the microtask, and “+1”
denotes that the worker attempted to answer the microtask and
the answer was correct. Set α−1 = 0, αλ = 1, α+1 = 1T ,
and κ = (µmax − µmin)TG with budget parameters µmax
and µmin denoting the maximum and minimum payments
respectively. Note that µmin is a constant that represents the
fixed reward, and κ
G∏
i=1
αxi represents the variable reward
that is determined by the worker’s answers. According to
the payment mechanism, the variable reward is multiplied by
a factor of 1T when the worker answers the microtask and
the answer is correct, and the variable reward reduces to 0
if the answer is wrong. Therefore, only when the worker’s
confidence towards a microtask is higher than T , the expected
payoff is positive and it is beneficial for the worker to answer
the microtask. Otherwise, there is a loss in expected reward
if the answer to the microtask is incorrect and in this case
the worker should use the skip option. Note that when the
confidence is exactly equal to T , the worker can choose
to either answer or skip the microtask. Under this payment
mechanism, the workers are encouraged to use the reject
option when they are not sure of their answer, i.e., when the
confidence regarding the question is smaller than T . Next, we
employ PT to model the rationality of the crowd workers in
deciding to answer or skip a microtask.
B. Behavior of Crowdworkers Predicted by Prospect Theory
In this subsection, we analyze the behavior of the honest
workers while considering their cognitive biases. We start with
a brief introduction of PT. According to PT, human cognitive
biases have the following two characteristics: (i) a human
decision maker is loss averse in that he/she strongly prefers
avoiding losses than achieving gains, (ii) humans are risk
seeking in events with small probabilities and are risk averse
in events with large probabilities, which can be interpreted as
people overweighting small probabilities and underweighting
large probabilities. Under PT, humans are loss averse and have
asymmetric valuation towards gains and losses through a value
function:
v(x) =
{
xδ x ≥ 0
−β(−x)δ x < 0 (4)
where v(x) assigns a subjective utility to an outcome x. A
positive x represents a gain and a negative x represents a loss.
As β changes, v(x) reflects different loss aversion attitudes
of humans. Under PT, gains and losses are perceived with
respect to a reference point, which is usually the current wealth
and is set to be 0 in (4). δ is the coefficient of diminishing
marginal utility and it suggests that as more gains are added
(or more losses are subtracted) to the present wealth, the
subjective utility of an additional gain (or loss) becomes more
insignificant. The value function v(x) is illustrated in Fig. 1(a).
As shown in Fig. 1(b), the probability weighting function
shows humans’ distorted perception of probability with which
an event occurs:
(a) Value function (b) Weight function
Fig. 1. Illustration of the value function and the weight function in prospect
theory
w(x) =
xα
(xα + (1− x)α)1/α (5)
where x is the actual probability and α is the probability
distortion coefficient. A smaller value of α means more severe
distortion of the actual probability x. For rational decision
makers, the PT behavioral parameters α = β = δ = 1.
In practice, these parameters can be estimated through real
experimental data and Tversky et al. showed that the means
of α, β and δ are 0.69, 2.25 and 0.88, respectively [47].
According to the expected utility theory (EUT) [48], when
a decision maker selects an action from a set of alternative
choices, the one that results in a higher expected payoff
is always preferred. In realistic environments, we employ
PT to model the rationality of the crowdworkers and study
their strategy in responding to the microtasks. In our set up,
the crowdworker has to decide whether to answer or skip
a particular microtask based on the confidence t , i.e., the
probability of correctly answering the microtask. Under PT, a
behaviorally biased crowdworker makes decisions according
to the following theorem to maximize the subjective payoff.
Theorem 1: If the confidence of a crowdworker with be-
havioral parameters α, β and δ towards a question is t, then
he/she decides to answer or skip a question according to the
following rule:
t
1− t
answer
≷
skip
(
βT
1− T
) δ
α
, η. (6)
Proof: See Appendix A
Note that (6) can be written as:
t
answer
≷
skip
t∗ , η
1 + η
. (7)
For a rational decision maker with α = β = δ = 1, t∗ = T and
the decision rule (6) suggests answering the question if t > T ,
and skip the question otherwise. We find that when βT ≥
1−T , t∗ becomes larger, i.e., the worker is more likely to skip
the question, as β, δ increase and α decreases. Otherwise, t∗
becomes smaller as δ increases and α, β decrease.
We consider that all the binary questions are equally difficult
and the wth crowd worker has average confidence t of
answering a question correctly. Let t follow the PDF fwt (t).
According to the behavior characterized in (7), the probability
that the wth crowd worker skips a question can be expressed
5as pw =
∫ t∗
0
fwt (t)dt. The probability that the answer is
correct, given the wth worker has submitted a definitive
answer, can be expressed as rw =
∫ 1
t∗ f
w
t (t)dt. Statistically,
pw determines the number of definitive answers n of the wth
worker and rw determines µ. Recall that the weight assignment
scheme in [29] is Ww(n) = µ−n. The variations of pw and
rw in the crowd may lead to different weights assigned to
the workers. Given the confidence PDFs of all the workers
Ft = {f1t (t), . . . , fWt (t)} and a priori T , the classification
performance obtained assuming that the workers are rational
is not accurate in predicting the system performance in realistic
situations, where the crowd workers make decisions under
cognitive biases. The first part of our simulations in Section
VI provides comparisons between the system performance for
a crowd with different behavioral properties.
IV. CLASSIFICATION IN THE PRESENCE OF SPAMMERS
Spammers are known to exist in large numbers on crowd-
sourcing platforms. They submit their answers randomly with-
out being relevant to the question being asked, in the hope
of earning some extra money. In this section, we determine
the optimal behavior of the spammers that maximizes their
expected monetary reward based on the payment mechanism
(3). By optimal behavior, we mean the optimal number of
questions to be skipped by the spammers. We assume that
a spammer skips g out of G gold standard questions, and
answers the remaining G− g by random guesses.
A. Spammers are Rational
First, we assume that the spammers behave rationally,
i.e., they do not have cognitive biases while calculating the
expected payoffs of answering or skipping a question. We
hereby define the spammers that skip all the microtasks as
Type I spammers, and the spammers that complete all the
microtasks as Type II spammers.
Proposition 1: To maximize the expected monetary reward,
a rational spammer completes all the microtasks (Type II) if
T < 12 , and skips all the microtasks (Type I) otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The above proposition gives the optimal strategy for the
spammers to participate in the crowdsourcing task. Since a
spammer can not distinguish the gold standard ones from the
other questions, the result derived in Proposition 1 indicates
that the spammers should either complete or skip all the
questions according to the value of T to maximize their
expected monetary reward. In realistic applications, the FC
selects T (T > 1/2) to ensure the high quality of the workers’
definitive answers (note that the workers’ minimum possible
value of the confidence regarding a question is 1/2, when
the answer is a random guess). In this case, according to
Proposition 1, all the spammers are Type I and choose to skip
all the microtasks. It is shown later in the paper (Appendix C)
that the answers from Type I spammers who respond λ to all
the microtasks are not aggregated for decision fusion. In other
words, the weights assigned to Type I spammers do not affect
the aggregation result and in this sense, we can consider all
Type I spammers to be honest. As a result, by assuming that
spammers behave rationally, all the workers in the crowd can
be treated as honest ones and the weight assignment scheme
is Ww(n) = µ−n.
B. Spammers are Modeled by PT
As the spammers are also human decision makers, we
employ PT to model their rationality and predict their behavior
in completing the micro-tasks. From the result of Theorem 1,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: To maximize the subjective monetary reward
under PT, a spammer with behavioral parameters α, β, δ
completes all the microtasks (Type II) if T > 1β+1 , and skips
all the tasks (Type I) otherwise.
Proof: Since a spammer employs random guesses to
respond to the microtasks, t = 1/2. From the result of
Theorem 1 and note α > 0, δ > 0, the corollary follows.
Based on the above analysis of the spammers’ behavior, we
study the optimal weight assignment strategy at the FC and
the classification performance in this section. As mentioned
earlier, the workers/spammers in crowdsourcing systems have
different backgrounds and are heterogeneous in their be-
havioral parameters α, β, δ. Considering that the spammers
behave according to Corollary 1, we need the loss aversion
coefficient β to predict whether the spammers answer or skip
all the questions. Since the spammers remain anonymous in
the crowd and certainly do not want to expose themselves,
elicitation of parameter β for the spammers is not possible.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that among
the crowd workers of size W , there are a total of M =
M0 + MN spammers, with M0 Type I spammers skipping
all the microtasks and MN Type II spammers completing all
the N microtasks.
The presence of spammers will significantly affect the
classification performance of the crowdsourcing system, which
may make it even worse when the spammers are starting
to act strategically. To ameliorate the spammers’ impact on
system performance, we propose the aggregation rule for
the FC by maximizing the candidate score assigned to the
correct classification class as in (2). We denote our method as
Amelioration of Spammers under PT (ASPT).
Proposition 2: In a crowd with M0 Type I spammers and
MN Type II spammers, the weight for the wth worker’s answer
under formulation (2) is given by
Ww(n) =
[
(W −M)µn + MN
2N (1−m)N
δ (n−N)
]−1
,
(8)
where n represents the number of definitive answers submitted
by the wth worker, and δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Since the answers from Type I spammers who respond λ
to all the microtasks are not aggregated for decision fusion,
M0 does not appear in the expression (8). In our scheme, the
honest workers whose answers are not all definitive employ
weights equal to Ww(n) = 1(W−M)µn . This is the same as
the weight assignment Ww(n) = µ−n developed in [29],
6f(WN+G,W0|MN ,M0) =
(
W −M0 −MN
W0 −M0
)
(mˆN+G)W0−M0(1− mˆN+G)W−W0−MN
·
(
W −W0 −MN
WN+G −MN
)
(1− mˆ)(N+G)(WN+G−MN ) (1− (1− mˆ)N+G)W−WN+G−W0 (9)
where all the workers are assumed to be honest5. For workers
who submit all definitive answers, the weight is decreased to
a smaller value by adding MN
2N (1−m)N to the denominator of
1
(W−M)µn . The weight assigned to a worker with all definitive
answers, namely, Ww(N) can not be large because it is likely
that this worker is a spammer. On the other hand, since it is
possible that this worker is honest, Ww(N) can not be too
small. Essentially maximization of the candidate score for the
correct classification class gives the optimal value of Ww(N),
leading to the expression in (8). The larger MN is, the more
likely that a worker with all definitive answers is a spammer.
Correspondingly, Ww(N) is smaller.
V. PARAMETER ESTIMATION AND PERFORMANCE
ANALYSIS OF ASPT
In this section, we present the parameter estimation tech-
nique used in our proposed method. Classification performance
and asymptotic performance will also be examined.
A. Parameter Estimation
The FC needs to estimate the crowd parameters µ, m,
MN , M0 before assigning weights to the workers. Following
our previous work [29], either the Training-based or the
Majority-voting based method is adopted to estimate µ. The
estimate of m is given by the ratio of the sum of skipped
questions and all the questions attempted by the crowd. Since
m and µ represent statistical parameters for the honest workers
in the crowd, the workers completing or skipping all the
questions are not incorporated in the parameter estimation
procedure to mitigate the impacts of spammers. The number
of Type I and II spammers M0 and MN are jointly estimated
using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method. G
gold standard questions are inserted into the N classification
questions, so that a worker responds to a total of N + G
questions. After answers from all the workers are collected by
the FC, we count the number of workers submitting N + G
definitive answers and skipping all the microtasks, denoted be
WN+G and W0, respectively. Given the numbers of Type I
and II spammers M0 and MN , the joint PDF of WN+G and
W0, f(WN+G,W0|MN ,M0), is expressed in (9), where mˆ is
the estimated m, and
(
a
b
)
= a!(a−b)!b! .
Therefore, by the MLE method, the estimates of M0 and
MN , which are denoted by Mˆ0 and MˆN respectively, can be
obtained as{
MˆN , Mˆ0
}
= arg max
{MN ,M0}≥0
f(WN+G,W0|MN ,M0).
(10)
5W −M is a constant representing the number of honest workers in our
scheme. Here, this constant acts as a scaling parameter.
By writing W = W0, . . . ,Wi, . . . ,WN+G where Wi is the
number of workers submitting i definitive answers for i =
0, . . . , N +G, MN and M0 can be more accurately estimated
according to{
MˆN , Mˆ0
}
= arg max
{MN ,M0}≥0
f(W|MN ,M0). (11)
However, the likelihood function f(W|MN ,M0) becomes
very complicated to compute. As we will see later in the
simulation results section, the approach using (10) is sufficient
to get a relatively accurate estimate of MN and M0. After the
estimates of µˆ, mˆ, MˆN , and Mˆ0 are obtained, the FC can
assign the appropriate weight to each worker based on (8)
and use the answers for aggregation.
B. Performance Analysis
In this section, we assume that there are M0 Type I
spammers and MN Type II spammers in a crowd population
of size W . The spammers attempt to maximize their monetary
rewards under the PT model as presented in Section IV. The
probability of correct classification Pc is investigated for the
weight assignment scheme (8). For simplicity, we assume that
the prior probabilities of the true answers for each microtask
to be 0 or 1 are equal. Note that we have a correct overall
classification only when all the N microtasks are correctly
labeled.
Proposition 3: The probability of correct classification Pc
in the crowdsourcing system is
Pc =
[1
2
+
1
2
∑
S
(
W,M
G
)
(F (G)− F ′(G))
+
1
4
∑
S′
(
W,M
G
)
(F (G)− F ′(G))
]N
(12)
with
F (G) =
mq0
(
1
2
)MN N∏
n=1
(1−µ)q−nµqn
((
N−1
n−1
)
(1−m)nmN−n
)q−n+qn
(13)
and
F ′(G) =
mq0
(
1
2
)MN N∏
n=1
(1−µ)qnµq−n
((
N−1
n−1
)
(1−m)nmN−n
)q−n+qn
(14)
where
G = {(q−N , q−N+1, . . . qN ,M ′N ,M ′′N ) :
7M = (2µ− 1) (1−m)
µ
(
1−m
µ
+m
)N−1
+
(W −M) (2µ− 1) (1−m)N ZM
(W −M)µNZM +MN
V = 1−m
(W −M)µ2
(
1−m
µ2
+m
)N−1
+
(
(W −M)(1−m)N +MN
)
Z2M
((W −M)µNZM +MN )2
− M
2
W −M . (18)
N∑
n=−N
qn =W −MN −M0,M ′N +M ′′N =MN},
(15)
and qn, M ′N , and M
′′
N take values from natural numbers
{0, 1, . . . },
S=
{
G :
N∑
n=1
(qn−q−n)Ww(n)+(M ′N−M ′′N )Ww(N) > 0
}
,
(16)
S′=
{
G :
N∑
n=1
(qn−q−n)Ww(n)+(M ′N−M ′′N )Ww(N) = 0
}
,
(17)
and
(
W,M
G
)
= (W−M0)!
M ′N !M
′′
N !
∏N
n=−N qn!
.
Proof: See Appendix D.
C. Asymptotic Performance Analysis
In a practical situation, the number of workers for the
crowdsourcing task is relatively large (normally in the hun-
dreds). Then, it is of great value to investigate the asymptotic
system performance when W approaches infinity. Here, we
give the asymptotic performance characterization for a large
crowd, i.e., for a large W .
Proposition 4: As the number of workers W approaches
infinity, the probability of correct classification Pc can be
expressed as
Pc =
[
Q
(
−M√V
)]N
, (19)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e
−t2
2 dt, and M and V are given in
(18) with ZM = 2N (1−m)N .
Proof: See Appendix E.
As stated above, the size of the crowd in practice can be
fairly large and the asymptotic result derived in (19) is a good
characterization of the actual performance. We further consider
that the percentages of Type I and Type II spammers in the
crowd are γ and  respectively and give the analysis for the
following two cases:
• Case 1: lim
W→∞
MO
W = γ > 0, limW→∞
MN
W =  = 0. In this
situation, we haveM = (2µ−1)(1−m)µ
(
1−m
µ +m
)N−1
+
(2µ−1)(1−m)N
µN
, which is a constant given m, µ and N .
V = 1W (1−γ)
(
1−m
µ2 (
1−m
µ2 +m)
N−1 + (1−m)
N
µN
−M2
)
.
Note that W (1 − γ) represents the number of honest
workers in the crowd. As there are more honest workers
in the crowd, V becomes smaller and the probability of
correct classification becomes larger. The expressions of
M and V analytically show that as long as the number of
honest workers is fixed, the number of Type I spammers
have no impact on the system performance.
• Case 2: lim
W→∞
MO
W = γ = 0, limW→∞
MN
W =  >
0. We have M = (2µ−1)(1−m)µ
(
1−m
µ +m
)N−1
+
(2µ−1)(1−m)NZM
µNZM+

1−
. As the percentage of Type II spammers
in the crowd  increases, M becomes smaller and the
classification performance in terms of Pc deteriorates. In
this scenario, it is not easy to show the monotonicity of
V with respect to  and we rely on simulations to show
that the probability of correct classification decreases as
 is larger.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the first part of this section, we consider that there are no
spammers in the crowd. Simulations are provided to illustrate
how PT affect the workers’ behavior and system performance.
A. Crowdsourcing Without Spammers
We plot the actual confidence thresholds of cognitively
biased crowdworkers t∗ with respect to the pre-designed
threshold T in Fig. 2 for humans with different behavioral
properties. It can be observed that t∗ becomes larger as T
increases. Since we restrict that T ≥ 0.5, βT > (1 − T ) is
satisfied. As a result, in Fig. 2(a) we see that t∗ becomes larger
as β increases and in Fig. 2(b) we see that t∗ becomes smaller
when α increases. Note that in the green curve in the upper
subplot, α = 0.69, β = 2.25 and δ = 0.88 are the mean values
of behavioral parameters of the humans from the experiment
in [47]. Hence, for this group of population, the green curve
represents the average t∗ employed by the nominal cognitively
biased workers. Since t∗ > T , we can see that the workers
are more likely to use the skip option in practice.
Next, we assume that the confidence t of the crowd workers
follows a uniform distribution U(0.5, x) where x is uniformly
distributed in [0.7, 0.9]. The size of the crowd is W = 30
and the confidence threshold T is set equal to 0.6. There are
N = 3 microtasks and G = 3 gold standard questions. In Fig.
3 , we plot the system performance in terms of probability of
correct classification Pc for crowds with different behavioral
parameters. If the workers in the crowd are assumed to be
rational, i.e., α = β = δ = 1, we obtain that Pc = 0.8445
and as the behavioral parameters change, Pc has different
values. Basically, given the distribution of the workers’ con-
fidence t, different behavioral parameters lead to different
confidence threshold t∗, which in turn causes variations of
the statistical parameters m and µ of the crowd, leading
8Fig. 2. Confidence thresholds of cognitively biased crowdworkers based on
PT
to different classification performances. In the upper subplot
where the probability distortion factor α = 0.68, Pc first
increases and then decreases as the loss aversion parameter
β becomes larger. Besides, Pc is higher as the diminishing
marginal utility parameter δ has a smaller value. In this case,
appropriate values of β and δ counter the probability distortion
factor α and improve the system performance. The behavioral
parameters α, β and δ jointly determine the overall probability
of correct classification Pc. Moreover, we can observe that the
best achievable Pc in this subplot is higher than Pc = 0.8445
when the crowd workers are assumed to be rational. In the
lower subplot where β = 2.25, Pc monotonically decreases
as α decreases from 1 to 0.5. Same to the upper subplot, we
have Pc become larger as δ has a smaller value.
Fig. 3. Classification accuracy when crowd workers have different behavioral
parameters.
B. Crowdsourcing in the Presence of Spammers
In this subsection, we present some simulation results to
illustrate the advantage of our proposed method ASPT, in
which PT is employed to characterize the behavior of spam-
mers. W = 50 workers participate in a crowdsourcing task
with N = 3 microtasks and G = 3 gold standard questions.
fp(p) is chosen as a uniform distribution U(0.2, 0.8), so that
the average probability of a honest worker skipping a task is
m = 0.6. Let fr(r) be a uniform distribution expressed as
U(x, 1) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and thus we can have µ varying
from 0.5 to 1.
TABLE I
ESTIMATES OF M0 AND MN
aaaaaa
MN
M0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
1 1,0 1,3 1,5 1,8 2,9 2,12 1,14 2,15 2,17 2,20
3 3,1 3,2 3,5 4,7 4,9 3,11 3,14 3,15 3,18 3,20
5 5,2 5,3 5,6 6,7 5,9 6,11 6,14 5,17 6,18 5,19
7 7,0 8,4 7,5 8,8 7,10 8,12 7,13 7,17 7,17 8,20
9 9,1 9,4 9,5 10,7 9,9 11,11 9,13 10,15 11,17 9,20
11 11,1 11,5 11,5 12,8 11,6 12,11 11,13 11,16 11,17 12,19
13 13,2 13,6 13,5 14,8 13,9 13,11 14,13 13,16 13,17 14,19
15 15,1 15,3 16,6 16,7 15,9 17,11 15,13 15,15 15,17 15,19
17 17,1 18,4 17,5 17,8 17,9 17,12 18,13 17,16 18,17 18,19
19 20,2 19,2 19,5 19,8 19,9 19,11 19,13 19,16 20,17 21,19
21 21,2 21,3 22,5 21,7 21,9 22,12 21,13 21,15 21,17 21,19
23 23,1 24,3 25,5 23,9 24,9 24,11 25,13 23,16 23,17 23,19
25 26,1 26,3 25,6 25,7 26,9 26,12 25,13 25,15 26,17 25,20
First, we show the efficiency of our methods for estimating
the parameters M0 and MN . Table I shows the estimation
results of M0 and MN , when the true numbers of spammers
are M0 = {1, 3, . . . , 19} and MN = {1, 3, . . . , 25}. Here, µ is
set as 0.75. The estimation process is based on the distribution
of the number of workers completing and skipping all the
questions WN+G and W0, and we can see from the table that
most pairs of numbers M0 and MN can be exactly estimated,
and the estimation errors are at most ±1.
Fig. 4. Performance comparison with spammers as µ increases.
We present the performance comparison between different
aggregation rules in Fig. 4, where the quality of the crowd
µ varies. For illustration, we assume that there are 14 spam-
mers in a crowd of 50 workers, and we have 7 spammers
9completing all the questions and the other 7 skipping all the
questions. As µ increases, we plot the probability of correct
classification Pc of four different weight assignment methods.
The first one is the ASPT developed in this paper, where
we employ PT for modeling the behavior of the spammers.
In the second approach, we exclude the workers who submit
all definitive answers and treat the remaining workers to be
honest. The weights assigned to the honest workers are given
by Ww = µ−n [29]. The third one is where we consider
the existence of spammer without incorporating PT, where all
the spammers are assumed to be Type I and the FC treats
all the workers to be honest, i.e., weight assignment rule
is Ww = µ−n no matter whether the workers submit all
definitive answers or not. The last approach is conventional
majority voting without a reject option, where all the workers
are assigned the same weight. It can be seen in Fig.4 that
at µ = 0.5, all the four curves merge to the same point.
It is because when µ = 0.5, even the honest workers are
making random guesses like a spammer. In this case, the FC
collects no useful information from the crowd and the choice
of weight assignment schemes does not make a difference. As
the quality of the crowd, µ, improves, the system performance
also improves as expected. The proposed ASPT performs
better than the method that excludes the workers with all
definitive answers and the method that treats all the workers
to be honest, which outperform the conventional majority
voting approach that does not have a reject option. It should
be noted that the second and the third methods have very
similar performances. Compared to treating all the workers as
honest ones, excluding the workers who submit all definitive
answers has the advantage of removing the side effects of
Type II spammers. At the same time, however, the second
method may also remove the honest workers who submit all
definitive answers for decision fusion, leading to a potential
deterioration. Hence, this trade-off determines whether the
second approach performs better than the third approach or
not.
Fig. 5. Performance comparison with different numbers of spammers.
In Fig. 5, we plot the performance comparison when the
number of spammers changes. For simplicity, we set that
M0 =MN , and µ is fixed at 0.75. As the number of spammers
increases, the classification performance degrades, where the
ASPT method gives the best performance. Furthermore, there
are two phenomena that need to be discussed:
1): When the number of spammers is small, the conventional
majority voting method is outperformed by the one that treats
all the workers as honest. However, this is not the case when
the number of spammers is large. The reason is that with
honest workers, the FC assigns a greater weight to the worker
with a larger number of definitive answers. In the regime
where MN is large, which means that the number of spammers
completing all the questions is large, the impact from the
spammers is much more severe on the performance with
such a weight assignment scheme. Thus, the corresponding
performance degrades significantly.
2): When the number of spammers is small, the method
that excludes the workers who submit all definitive answers
performs better than the method that treats all the workers to
be honest, and vice versa. It can be explained by the fact that
in the crowd when the percentage of spammers is small, the
second method (the one that excludes the workers who submit
all definitive answers) has a smaller probability to remove Type
II spammers and has a higher probability to remove honest
workers. On the other hand, when the percentage of spammers
is large, the probability of excluding Type II spammers is large
and that of excluding honest workers is small.
Fig. 6. Performance comparison as W increases.
Lastly, we keep the number of spammers in the crowd fixed,
with M0 = MN = 7 and plot the asymptotic performance as
the crowd population W increases in Fig. 6. We can see that
our proposed approach has the best performance among all the
weight assignment strategies. Analogous to the explanations
provided for results presented in Fig. 5, we observe that when
W is small, i.e., when the percentage of spammers is large, the
method that excludes the workers with all definitive answers
and the majority voting method outperform the method that
treats all the workers to be honest, and vice versa.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have explored a novel framework of crowdsourcing
systems to solve classification problems, where the crowd
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workers may skip a microtask if the confidence regarding
the question being asked is lower than a threshold. Our
scheme is extremely effective in dealing with spammers as
it: (i) exploits the behavioral differences of honest workers
and spammers in realistic situations, where the rationality
of humans is modeled via PT; (ii) estimates the number of
spammers in the crowd and (iii) designs the optimal weight
for every worker in the weighted majority voting fusion rule.
We provide analytical expressions for probability of correct
classification and asymptotic system performance. Compared
to rational decision makers, the honest crowd workers and
spammers behave in a different manner if PT is incorporated to
model their rationality. To accurately characterize the system
performance, the behavioral property of the crowd must be
taken into consideration. Simulation results illustrate the effi-
ciency of our method compared to other weight assignment
schemes that do not include the humans behavior using a
prospect theoretic approach.
This work employed a psychologically accurate descrip-
tion of human behavior in crowdsourcing environments. We
provided insights in designing strategies to ameliorate the
side impacts of human spammers. Our study can also be
applied to analyze and model sophisticated human behavior
under different payment mechanisms in many applications.
Our future work includes the study of task allocation in
crowdsourcing considering the behavioral differences of the
crowd. As the security issues of distributed inference systems
are becoming increasingly important, we also plan to investi-
gate the robustness of the proposed crowdsourcing algorithm
against adversarial attacks.
APPENDIX A
Let the perception of the variable reward before answering
the question be denoted as Z. According to the payment
mechanism (3), Z = (µmax − µmin)TG before answering
any question. In case that the worker has already provided
definitive answers to i = 1, . . . , L questions, the expected
variable reward is
Z = (µmax − µmin)TG
L∏
i=1
ti
T
(20)
where ti is the worker’s confidence on the ith question. Hence,
we have Z > 0.
If the worker decides to answer the question, there is a
probability of t that the answer is correct and Z is multiplied
by 1T , and a probability of 1 − t that the answer is wrong
leading to Z = 0. By using the current expected reward Z
as a reference point, and applying the value function to the
gains (losses) and the probability weighting function to the
probabilities, the subjective payoff if the worker answers this
question is expressed as:
SP (t) = w(t)v(Z(
1
T
− 1)) + w(1− t)v(−Z) (21)
On the other hand, if the worker skips the question, the
expected reward Z stays the same and hence, the subjective
payoff is 0. The worker makes a decision by choosing the
action which yields a higher subjective payoff
SP
answer
≷
skip
0. (22)
which becomes the result of Theorem 1 after simplification.
APPENDIX B
If a spammer skips g out of G gold standard questions
and answers the remaining G − g with random guesses, the
expected monetary reward E for the spammer is expressed as
E = (µmax − µmin)TG
G∏
i=1
αxi + µmin
= (µmax − µmin)TG(1
2
)G−g(
1
T
)G−g + µmin
= (µmax − µmin)(1
2
)G(2T )g + µmin, (23)
where X = {x1, . . . , xG} are the spammer’s responses to the
gold standard questions. Since 0 ≤ g ≤ G, E is maximized
as following
if T <
1
2
⇒ g = 0, if T > 1
2
⇒ g = G. (24)
APPENDIX C
When there are M spammers in the crowd with M0 skipping
and MN completing all the questions, the expected weight
contributed to the correct class is given by
EC [W]
=
W−M∑
w=1
Ep,r
[
N∑
n=0
Ww(n)r(n)P(n)
]
+
M0∑
w=1
Ww(n = 0)
+
MN∑
w=1
1
2N
Ww(n = N)
=
N∑
n=0
(W −M)Ww(n)µn
(
N
n
)
(1−m)nmN−n
+
N∑
n=0
M0Ww(n)δ(n) +
N∑
n=0
MN
2N
Ww(n)δ(n−N)
=
N∑
n=0
(W−M)Ww(n)µnP(n)+
N∑
n=0
M0
P(0)
Ww(n)P(n)δ(n)
+
N∑
n=0
MN
2NP(N)
Ww(n)P(n)δ(n−N)
=
N∑
n=0
Ww(n)S(n)P(n) (25)
where r(n) is the product of any n out of N variables rw,i for
i = 1, . . . , N , which represents the probability that n answers
are correct given n definitive answers have been submitted6.
P(n) =
(
N
n
)
(1−m)nmN−n represents the probability that the
wth worker submits a total of n definitive answers. In the last
step of (25), S(n) = (W−M)µn+ M0
mN
δ(n)+ MN
2N (1−m)N δ(n−
N).
6Candidate scores are assigned to the correct class only when all the
definitive answers are correct.
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Since
N∑
n=0
P(n) = 1, (25) is upper-bounded according to
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
EC [W] =
N∑
n=0
Ww(n)S(n)P(n)
≤
√√√√ N∑
n=0
(Ww(n)S(n))2P(n)
√√√√ N∑
n=0
P(n) = α (26)
Also note that equality holds in (26) only if
Ww(n)S(n)
√
P(n) = α
√
P(n), where α is a positive
constant such that Ww(n)S(n) = α.
Therefore, the optimal weight assignment is obtained
Ww(n)=
[
(W−M)µn+M0
mN
δ (n)+
MN
2N (1−m)N δ (n−N)
]−1
(27)
Note that the final classification decision d∗ corresponds
to a unique N -bit word, and each bit, 1 or 0, represents the
decision of a microtask. From the Proposition 1 in [29], we
know that the classification rule (1) is equivalent to the bit-
by-bit decision for the ith bit
W∑
w=1
Tw
H1
≷
H0
0 (28)
for i = 1, . . . , N , with
Tw =Ww(n) (I1 〈i, w〉 − I0 〈i, w〉) , (29)
where Is 〈i, w〉 , s ∈ {0, 1}, is the indicator function that
equals 1 if the answer of the wth worker to the ith question
is s, and it equals 0 otherwise.
Hence, if a worker submits no definitive answers and
skips all the questions, i.e., n = 0, his/her decision is not
taken into consideration for aggregation at the FC. Thus,
we can assign any weight to the worker with n = 0.
Essentially we are neglecting Type I spammers and exclud-
ing them for classification. For simplicity and consistency
purpose, we drop the second term on the right hand side
of (27) and write the weight assignment as Ww(n) =[
(W −M)µn + MN
2N (1−m)N δ (n−N)
]−1
.
APPENDIX D
Following Appendix B, the ith bit of the final aggregated
N -bit word is determined by (28) and Tw is the weighted
decision from the wth worker. Let Hs denote the hypothesis
that a microtask has true answer to be s for s = 0, 1. If the
wth worker is honest, the probability mass function (PMF) of
Tw under hypothesis Hs, Pr (Tw|Hs), is given as
Pr
(
Tw = I(−1)t+1Ww(n)|Hs
)
=
{
r
1−|s−t|
w,i (1− rw,i)|s−t|ϕn(w), I = 1
pw,i, I = 0
, t ∈ {0, 1}, (30)
where I = I1 〈i, w〉 + I0 〈i, w〉, ϕn(w) = (1 −
pw,i)
∑
C
N∏
j=1,j 6=i
p
kj
w,j(1− pw,j)1−kj represents the probability
that the wth worker gives a definitive answer to the ith
question and the total number of definitive answers he/she
submitted is n. C is defined as the set
C =
{k1, . . . , ki−1, ki+1, . . . , kN} :
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj=N−n
 (31)
with kj ∈ {0, 1} and n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. On the other hand,
if the wth worker is a Type II spammer who submits a
definitive answer randomly, Tw has the following probability
mass function:
Pr(Tw) =
{
1/2, Tw =Ww(N)
−1/2, Tw = −Ww(N) (32)
Under the assumption that hypotheses H0 and H1 are
equally likely, the probability of correct classification for the
ith bit Pc,i is Pc,i =
1+Pd,i−Pf,i
2 , where Pd,i is the probability
of detection, i.e., deciding the ith bit to be “1” when the
true bit is “1” and Pf,i is the probability of false alarm, i.e.,
deciding the ith bit to be “1” when the true bit is “0”.
For the honest workers from a total of W workers, let G0
denote the subgroup that decides “0” for ith microtask, G1 the
subgroup that decides “1” and Gλ the subgroup that decides
λ. Moreover, out of the MN Type II spammers we assume
that there are M ′N spammers deciding “1” for the i
th bit and
M ′′N deciding “0”. We employ the result in (30) and assume
that the workers answer the questions independently. Under
H1, the probability of the crowd’s answer profile for the ith
bit is {G0, G1, Gλ,M ′N ,M ′′N} can be expressed as
Fi =
(
1
2
)M′N(1
2
)M′′N ∏
w∈Gλ
pw
∏
w∈G0
(1− rw,i)ϕnw (w)∏
w∈G1
rw,iϕnw (w) (33)
where nw represents the total number definitive questions
submitted by the individual. Let qn,−N ≤ n ≤ N , denote
the number of honest workers that submit |n| total definitive
answers to all the microtasks. Specifically, n < 0 indicates the
group of honest workers that submit “0” for the ith bit while
n > 0 indicates “1”. For n = 0, q0 represents the number
of honest workers that submit λ for the ith bit. Note that the
number of honest workers in subgroups G0 , G1 and Gλ are
equal to
∑−N
n=−1 qn,
∑N
n=1 qn and q0, respectively. Denoting
G = {(q−N , q−N+1, . . . qN ,M ′N ,M ′′N ) :
N∑
n=−N
qn =W −MN −M0,M ′N +M ′′N =MN}, (34)
with natural numbers M ′N , M
′′
N , and qn for {n =
−N, . . . , 0, . . . , N}. From the result in (33), the answer profile
for the ith bit G has the following probability under H1
F (G) =
mq0
(
1
2
)MN N∏
n=1
(1−µ)q−nµqn
((
N−1
n−1
)
(1−m)nmN−n
)q−n+qn
(35)
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where we substitute the expression of ϕn(w) using(
N−1
n−1
)
(1−m)nmN−n. Based on the above results, the prob-
ability of detection Pd,i can be expressed as
Pd,i =
∑
S
(
W,M
G
)
Fi(G) +
1
2
∑
S′
(
W,M
G
)
Fi(G), (36)
where
(
W,M
G
)
= (W−M0)!
M ′N !M
′′
N !
∏N
n=−N qn!
represents all possible
combinations in the answer profile G and
S=
{
G :
N∑
n=1
(qn−q−n)Ww(n)+(M ′N−M ′′N )Ww(N) > 0
}
(37)
S′=
{
G :
N∑
n=1
(qn−q−n)Ww(n)+(M ′N−M ′′N )Ww(N) = 0
}
(38)
where S represents the scenario where
∑W
w=1 Tw > 0 and “1”
is decided under H1, and S′ is the case where
∑W
w=1 Tw = 0
and the FC decides “1” with probability 1/2.
Similarly, we can obtain Pf,i given pw,i and rw,i as
Pf,i =
∑
S
(
W,M
G
)
Fi
′(G) + 1
2
∑
S′
(
W,M
G
)
Fi
′(G). (39)
where
F ′(G) =
mq0
(
1
2
)MN N∏
n=1
(1−µ)qnµq−n
((
N−1
n−1
)
(1−m)nmN−n
)q−n+qn
(40)
Then, the expected probability of correct classification for the
ith bit Pc,i can be obtained as
Pc,i =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
S
(
W,M
G
)(
Fi (G)− F ′i (G)
)
+
1
4
∑
S′
(
W,M
G
)(
Fi (G)− F ′i (G)
)
(41)
A correct classification result is obtained if and only if all the
bits in the N -bit word are classified correctly, and recall that
the microtasks are completed independently. The probability
of correct classification of the final result is given as
Pc = E
[
N∏
i=1
pc,i
]
=
N∏
i=1
E [pc,i] = P
N
c,i, (42)
where pc,i is the realization of the probability of correct
decision for the ith bit. Therefore, the crowdsourcing system
has overall correct classification probability Pc that is given
by
Pc =
[1
2
+
1
2
∑
S
(
W,M
G
)(
F (G)− F ′ (G))
+
1
4
∑
S′
(
W,M
G
)(
F (G)− F ′ (G)) ]N , (43)
APPENDIX E
For an honest worker, the statistic Tw has PMF given in
(30) and the expected Tw of an honest worker under H1 is
given by
EHH1=E
[
1∑
t=0
N∑
n=1
(−1)t+1Ww(n)(rw,i)t(1−rw,i)1−tϕn(w)
]
(44)
Substituting the expression of Ww(n) in (8), we have
EHH1 = (2µ− 1)
N∑
n=1
Ww(n)
(
N − 1
n− 1
)
(1−m)nmN−n (45)
=
2µ− 1
W −M
N−1∑
n=1
(
N − 1
n− 1
)(
1−m
µ
)n
mN−n
+
(2µ− 1) (1−m)N
(W −M)µN + MN
2N (1−m)N
(46)
=
(2µ− 1) (1−m)
(W −M)µ
(
1−m
µ
+m
)N−1
+
(2µ− 1) (1−m)N ZM
(W −M)µNZM +MN , (47)
where ZM = 2N (1−m)N . The variance of the statistic Tw
for an honest worker can be expressed as:
V HH1 ,
(
E
[
T 2w
]− (EHH1)2) (48)
=E
[
1∑
t=0
N∑
n=1
(Ww(n))
2(rw,i)
t(1−rw,i)1−tϕn(w)
]
−(EHH1)2
(49)
=
1
(W −M)2
N−1∑
n=1
(
N − 1
n− 1
)(
1−m
µ2
)n
mN−n
+
(1−m)N(
(W −M)µN + MN
2N (1−m)N
)2 − (EHH1)2 (50)
=
1−m
(W −M)2 µ2
(
1−m
µ2
+m
)N−1
+
(1−m)N Z2M
((W −M)µNZM +MN )2
− (EHH1)2 (51)
On the other hand, the statistic Tw of Type II spammers has
PMF (32). In this case, the expected value of Tw under H1 is
given by
ESH1 =
1∑
t=0
N∑
n=N
(−1)t+1Ww(n)
(
1
2
)t(
1
2
)1−t
= 0 (52)
For Type II spammers, the variance of Tw under H1 is given
by
V SH1 ,
(
E
[
T 2w
]− (ESH1)2) (53)
= E
[
1∑
t=0
N∑
n=N
(Ww(n))
2
(
1
2
)t(
1
2
)1−t]
(54)
=
1(
(W −M)µN + MN
2N (1−m)N
)2
=
Z2M
((W −M)µNZM +MN )2
(55)
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As the number of workers W increases to infinity, according
to the Central Limit Theorem, the statistic
∑W
w=1 Tw can be
approximated by a Gaussian random variable:
Tw∼
{
H1 : N (M1, V1)
H0 : N (M0, V0) as w →∞ (56)
Under H1, we have obtained the mean and variance of Tw for
a single honest worker and a spammer. Note that in the crowd
there are W −M honest workers and MN Type II spammers.
Since the workers/spammers complete the tasks independently,
we have
M1 =(W −M)EHH1 +MNESH1 (57)
=
(2µ− 1) (1−m)
µ
(
1−m
µ
+m
)N−1
+
(W −M) (2µ− 1) (1−m)N ZM
(W −M)µNZM +MN (58)
and
V1 =(W −M)V HH1 +MNV SH1 (59)
=
1−m
(W −M)µ2
(
1−m
µ2
+m
)N−1
+
(
(W −M)(1−m)N +MN
)
Z2M
((W −M)µNZM +MN )2
− M
2
1
W −M (60)
From similar procedures, under H0 we can obtain M0 =
−M1 = −M and V0 = V1 = V . Since the ith bit is
determined via (28), it is clear to see that the probability of
correct classification of the ith bit is Pc,i = Q(−M√V ). By
considering the N bits independently, we obtain the desired
result.
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